03034cam a22003733u 450000100060000000300070000600500170001300600020003000700050003200800410003704000110007804100170008905000070010610000320011324000500014524500550019526400510025030000470030133600260034833700260037433800360040050000310043650801170046752017860058453400630237065300140243365300370244765300310248465300190251565300410253470000230257585600430259899900190264176175UtSlPG20260610134749.0mcr n260607r20251922utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d  aUtSlPG 7ahu2iso639-1 4aJC1 aFaguet, Émile,d1847-191610aEt l'horreur des responsabilités. Hungarian15a"... és a felelősségtől való rettegés" 1aSalt Lake City, UT :bProject Gutenberg,c2025  a1 online resource :bmultiple file formats  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  aRelease date is 2025-05-28  aAlbert László from page images generously made available by the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences  a"... és a felelősségtől való rettegés" : "A kontárság kultuszának" folytatása by Émile Faguet is a political and legal essay written in the early 20th century. It argues that a cultural fear of responsibility has shaped French institutions since the Revolution, encouraging mechanical legality, bureaucratic dependence, and moral evasion. Building on his earlier critique of incompetence, Faguet probes how legal doctrines and administrative structures foster unaccountable judges and a subservient judiciary.  The opening of the work stakes a bold thesis: modern France strives to make decision-makers irresponsible, especially in law. Faguet contrasts judges who rigidly apply statutes (thereby avoiding moral judgment) with the older, precedent-shaping English judges and the Roman praetors who accepted real responsibility. He revisits Montesquieu versus Voltaire on the venality of offices, arguing that hereditary or purchased judicial posts once secured independence from the executive, whereas the Revolution tethered courts to the government, producing a double irresponsibility (strict textualism plus political dependence). To illustrate, he dissects a case against Cardinal Luçon about mixed public schools, accusing the court of trusting ministerial assurances, neglecting factual inquiry, and even twisting a legal opinion. He then analyzes the Dreyfus affair’s cassation ruling, claiming the court subtly inverted a procedural article to avoid remand, thereby serving state convenience while leaving the affair morally unresolved. The section closes by hinting at ministerial influence behind such outcomes, underscoring the book’s core theme: institutions engineered to evade accountability. (This is an automatically generated summary.)  pOriginally published:cBudapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1922  aDemocracy  aNational characteristics, French  aAristocracy (Social class)  aResponsibility  aJustice, Administration of -- France1 aSzánthó, Gyula40uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76175  c116900d116900