03055cam a22003253u 450000100060000000300070000600500170001300600020003000700050003200800410003704000110007804100170008905000090010610000330011524500270014825000200017526400510019530000470024633600260029333700260031933800360034550000310038150801700041252019000058253400620248265300630254465300240260785600550263185600430268677798UtSlPG20260610134813.0mcr n260607r20261921utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d  aUtSlPG 7aen2iso639-1 4aD5011 aStuart, Campbell,d1885-197210aSecrets of Crewe House  aFourth edition. 1aSalt Lake City, UT :bProject Gutenberg,c2026  a1 online resource :bmultiple file formats  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  aRelease date is 2026-01-28  adeaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)  a"Secrets of Crewe House" by Campbell Stuart is a historical account written in the early 20th century. It traces how Britain orchestrated and delivered propaganda into enemy countries during the closing year of the Great War, under Viscount Northcliffe’s leadership. The work emphasizes strategy, organization, and inter-Allied cooperation, showing how targeted messaging weakened enemy morale—most strikingly in Austria-Hungary and then in Germany.

The opening of the work sets out its purpose and limits: it records a pioneering wartime effort whose full details cannot always be revealed, arguing that the results—and even German reactions—prove its impact. It defines propaganda as truth-based, consistent, and discreet, explains how to create a receptive “atmosphere,” and contrasts these principles with Germany’s failed, contradictory efforts, underscored by Ludendorff’s later laments. It then outlines the department’s creation, staff, and structure at Crewe House, its close daily coordination with other British offices, and its modest budget. The first major campaign targeted Austria-Hungary by backing subject nationalities’ aspirations and sapping frontline resolve; through the Rome Congress, an inter-Allied commission, and mass leafleting, songs, and patrols, desertions rose and the Piave offensive faltered—despite Italian political hesitations. Turning to Germany, the narrative notes Britain’s early neglect, later War Office initiatives like Le Courrier de l’Air, the shift from aeroplane drops to ingenious hydrogen balloons, and the scaling up of leaflet delivery. It closes this opening section with H. G. Wells’s policy framework: pair unwavering Allied resolve with a credible postwar settlement—a League of Free Nations—and press for internal change in Germany as the only path to peace. (This is an automatically generated summary.)  pOriginally published:cLondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921  aGreat Britain. Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries  aPropaganda, British4 uhttps://archive.org/details/secretsofcreweho00stua40uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77798