02960cam a22003373u 4500 78609 UtSlPG 20260610134825.0 m cr n 260607r20261930utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d UtSlPG en iso639-1 DT Anderson, Eugene Newton, 1900-1984 The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906 Salt Lake City, UT : Project Gutenberg, 2026 1 online resource : multiple file formats text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Release date is 2026-05-05 Galo Flordelis (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) "The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906" by Eugene Newton Anderson is a historical study written in the early 20th century. It analyzes how the Moroccan question became a test of European diplomacy, tracing the alignments, rivalries, and calculations that set the stage for later pre-war crises. The focus is on the interplay between France, Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy, and Russia, with Morocco’s internal instability serving as the catalyst and backdrop. The opening of this study explains that the book treats Morocco chiefly as a stage for European power politics, arguing that the first Moroccan crisis fixed mindsets and alignments for later confrontations. It outlines sources (notably British and German document collections and French “Livres jaunes”), flags the thin French archival record, and frames diplomacy as the choices of a few key actors under the pressure of public opinion. The narrative then sketches Morocco’s decay under Sultan Abd-el-Aziz—financial folly, revolts, insecurity—and shows France advancing a “pacific penetration” via Algeria while publicly affirming the sultan’s sovereignty. Early steps include flexible frontier arrangements, military and financial assistance to the sultan, and the failure of Moroccan appeals to Britain and Germany. Next, the work describes the Franco-Italian entente: secret understandings that traded freedom of action in Morocco for Italy’s latitude in Tripoli and pledged Italian neutrality if France fought after “direct provocation,” blunting anti-French edges of the Triple Alliance. It closes this opening portion by setting up Spain’s weakened post-1898 position and its anxious stake in northern Morocco, paving the way for a Franco-Spanish understanding. (This is an automatically generated summary.) Originally published: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930 Morocco -- Foreign relations Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 Europe -- Politics and government -- 20th century https://archive.org/details/bwb_T3-BGL-716 https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78609 119327 119327