02833cam a22003253u 450000100060000000300070000600500170001300600020003000700050003200800410003704000110007804100170008905000070010610000590011324501780017226400510035030000470040133600260044833700260047433800360050050000310053650802000056752015010076753400450226865300340231370000480234770000520239585600430244799900170249058256UtSlPG20260610134337.0mcr n260607r2018||||utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d  aUtSlPG 7aen2iso639-1 4aDS1 aKuropatkin, A. N.q(Alekseĭ Nikolaevich),d1848-192514aThe Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2) :bBeing Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East 1aSalt Lake City, UT :bProject Gutenberg,c2018  a1 online resource :bmultiple file formats  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  aRelease date is 2018-11-11  aE-text prepared by Brian Coe, David Tipple, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org)  a"The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2)" by A. N. Kuropatkin is a historical account written in the early 20th century. This work focuses on the military policy, strategy, and failures of the Imperial Russian Army during its campaign against Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, particularly highlighting the author's experiences and insights as a commanding general." The book serves as a retrospective examination of the reasons behind Russia’s defeats, providing a detailed analysis of military operations and the ensuing political context that affected the war's outcome.  "The opening of this historical account presents the author's intention to clarify the complexities surrounding Russia's military failures in the war against Japan." It begins with a summary of the issues facing the Russian War Department over the past two centuries, addressing both the readiness of the Russian army and the strategic missteps that hindered their success. General Kuropatkin delves into various battles, the operational challenges faced in Manchuria, and the mistakes of command, while asserting that many of these failures stem from political mismanagement and a lack of vital resources. The narrative establishes a critical tone as Kuropatkin laments that the war ended prematurely despite opportunities for a decisive Russian victory, framing his observations within the context of broader historical military practices and national policy. (This is an automatically generated summary.)  nOriginal publication data not identified  aRusso-Japanese War, 1904-19051 aSwinton, E. D.q(Ernest Dunlop),d1868-19511 aLindsay, A. B.q(Alexander Bertram),d1872-191440uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/58256  c99083d99083