000			03113cam a22003613u 4500
001			76219
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005			20260610134750.0
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007			cr n
008			260607r20251918utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d
010			_a18005493
040			_aUtSlPG
041		7	_aen _2iso639-1
050		4	_aD501
100	1		_aFreytag-Loringhoven, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann, Freiherr von, _d1855-1924
245	1	0	_aDeductions from the World War
264		1	_aSalt Lake City, UT : _bProject Gutenberg, _c2025
300			_a1 online resource : _bmultiple file formats
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aSequel: A nation trained in arms or a militia? ...
500			_aRelease date is 2025-06-27
508			_aAl Haines
520			_a"Deductions from the World War" by Freytag-Loringhoven is a military treatise written in the early 20th century. It distills lessons from the Great War on strategy, leadership, national psychology, technology, and the political–economic foundations of power, arguing from a German general’s perspective for rigorous, future-oriented preparation. The work is analytical and unapologetically realist, aimed at officers and an informed public seeking to understand how states must organize for modern, total war. The opening of the work introduces the author’s career and authority, explains the book’s intended German audience and restricted circulation, and frames its core claim that war is rooted in human nature. The foreword argues that even before the conflict ends, nation and army must reexamine policy, economics, and organization to draw practical conclusions. The first chapters survey the Central Powers’ unfavorable coalition position, the entente’s maritime and economic advantages, and the rise of world-economics and sea power as decisive factors; they also recount how occupations and Balkan campaigns pursued strategic and economic aims, and how a missed decisive victory early in the West lengthened the war. A chapter on mass psychology contrasts national armies and morale across France, Britain, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, attributing endurance and success chiefly to moral strength and discipline. The discussion of technology highlights railways, telegraphy, aircraft, heavy artillery, gas, and field fortification, arguing that fortified zones and elastic defense now shape operations more than old-style fortresses. The early section on leadership insists that, despite new weapons, decision still turns on command and will, weighing envelopment versus breakthrough, explaining entrenched warfare’s rise, and justifying selective withdrawals to stronger lines to conserve forces and economic assets. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534			_pOriginally published: _cNew York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918
653			_aWorld War, 1914-1918
653			_aWar
653			_aGermany. Heer
856	4		_uhttps://archive.org/details/deductionsfromwo01frey
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76219
999			_c116944 _d116944