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010 _a24016926
040 _aUtSlPG
041 7 _ait
_2iso639-1
050 4 _aD501
100 1 _aFerrero, Guglielmo,
_d1871-1942
245 1 3 _aLa tragedia della pace
264 1 _aSalt Lake City, UT :
_bProject Gutenberg,
_c2025
300 _a1 online resource :
_bmultiple file formats
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aRelease date is 2025-07-19
508 _aBarbara Magni and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library)
520 _a"La tragedia della pace : Da Versailles alla Ruhr" by Guglielmo Ferrero is a collection of political essays and historical analysis written in the early 20th century. The work probes the European settlement after the First World War, arguing that the collapse of old monarchies left a vacuum of legitimacy filled by raw force, punitive passions, and contradictory aims. It scrutinizes Versailles through themes such as reparations, disarmament, shifting borders, and the stillborn promise of the League of Nations, contrasting Wilson’s idealism with Clemenceau’s power politics. The book’s likely focus is how a peace made without clear principles risks perpetuating conflict from France to the Ruhr. The opening of this work sets out Ferrero’s thesis: the war ended in the ruin of Europe’s monarchical order, but the victors, driven by ressentiment and the “chimera of unlimited power,” failed to replace it with sound principles, leaving force to rule where authority had died. In “Le baionette e l’idea” he calls the war “millions of bayonets seeking an idea,” warning that 1848’s promises reappear in distorted form and that peace will be chaos unless institutions and limits are rebuilt. He critiques Clemenceau’s reliance on armaments and alliances over true international guarantees, doubting any lasting quadruplice and urging that the pen must substitute for the sword. Reporting from Paris, he notes the obsession with reparations, the babel of clashing aims, and the peril of disarming and humiliating Germany while inventing buffer states and borders that lack consent. He labels Europe’s statecraft a “new infancy,” contrasts Vienna’s sober legitimacy with Napoleonic improvisation, chides Europeans for expecting endless American “miracles,” and closes this opening stretch by flagging the paradox of the great absentees—Russia and Germany—whose shadow dominates the peace. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534 _pOriginally published:
_cMilano: Athena, 1923
653 _aParis Peace Conference (1919-1920)
653 _aWorld War, 1914-1918 -- Peace
653 _aWorld War, 1914-1918 -- Influence
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/76526
999 _c117251
_d117251