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010 _a12008151
040 _aUtSlPG
041 7 _afr
_2iso639-1
050 4 _aBD
100 1 _aFaguet, Émile,
_d1847-1916
245 1 4 _aLes préjugés nécessaires
264 1 _aSalt Lake City, UT :
_bProject Gutenberg,
_c2025
300 _a1 online resource :
_bmultiple file formats
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aRelease date is 2025-10-23
505 0 _aL'animal social -- L'amour de la vie -- Le libre arbitre -- La morale -- Les religions -- La vie future -- La Némésis -- La réversibilité des fautes -- Le culte de la force -- L'aristocratie -- Le mariage -- La propriété -- Le Ama nescire -- Luttes et transformations -- Les préjugés nécessaires.
508 _aLaurent Vogel (This file was produced from images generously made available by the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF/Gallica))
520 _aLes préjugés nécessaires by Émile Faguet is a philosophical treatise written in the early 20th century. It examines how societies are built and held together by “necessary prejudices”—beliefs people adopt less from proof than from social need. Arguing that humans are naturally familial and only reluctantly social, it claims war both creates and sustains society, forging civic cohesion and recasting instincts. The work appears set to analyze core beliefs (such as love of life and free will) as instruments that align individuals with collective survival. The opening of this treatise questions whether humans are innately social, comparing us with solitary, social, and gregarious animals and concluding we most resemble the gregarious. It traces a path from prolonged childrearing to family, sedentarism, domestication, and agriculture, then argues that true society arose not from the family but from war driven by population pressure, which necessitated defensive coalitions, laws, and permanent states that elevate martial virtues. Faguet then defines “necessary prejudices” and illustrates two: love of life, which society redirects from personal impulse to patriotic self-sacrifice, and free will, treated as a probable illusion yet a socially imposed creed that grounds responsibility, punishment, remorse, and conversion. The section closes by canvassing critiques of volition (Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Ribot) while explaining why belief in freedom persists because society requires it. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534 _pOriginally published:
_cParis: Société française d'imprimerie et de librairie, 1911
653 _aEthics
653 _aLife
856 4 _uhttps://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k81311b
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77112
999 _c117834
_d117834