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001			77798
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040			_aUtSlPG
041		7	_aen _2iso639-1
050		4	_aD501
100	1		_aStuart, Campbell, _d1885-1972
245	1	0	_aSecrets of Crewe House
250			_aFourth edition.
264		1	_aSalt Lake City, UT : _bProject Gutenberg, _c2026
300			_a1 online resource : _bmultiple file formats
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aRelease date is 2026-01-28
508			_adeaurider and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
520			_a"Secrets of Crewe House" by Campbell Stuart is a historical account written in the early 20th century. It traces how Britain orchestrated and delivered propaganda into enemy countries during the closing year of the Great War, under Viscount Northcliffe’s leadership. The work emphasizes strategy, organization, and inter-Allied cooperation, showing how targeted messaging weakened enemy morale—most strikingly in Austria-Hungary and then in Germany. The opening of the work sets out its purpose and limits: it records a pioneering wartime effort whose full details cannot always be revealed, arguing that the results—and even German reactions—prove its impact. It defines propaganda as truth-based, consistent, and discreet, explains how to create a receptive “atmosphere,” and contrasts these principles with Germany’s failed, contradictory efforts, underscored by Ludendorff’s later laments. It then outlines the department’s creation, staff, and structure at Crewe House, its close daily coordination with other British offices, and its modest budget. The first major campaign targeted Austria-Hungary by backing subject nationalities’ aspirations and sapping frontline resolve; through the Rome Congress, an inter-Allied commission, and mass leafleting, songs, and patrols, desertions rose and the Piave offensive faltered—despite Italian political hesitations. Turning to Germany, the narrative notes Britain’s early neglect, later War Office initiatives like Le Courrier de l’Air, the shift from aeroplane drops to ingenious hydrogen balloons, and the scaling up of leaflet delivery. It closes this opening section with H. G. Wells’s policy framework: pair unwavering Allied resolve with a credible postwar settlement—a League of Free Nations—and press for internal change in Germany as the only path to peace. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534			_pOriginally published: _cLondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921
653			_aGreat Britain. Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries
653			_aPropaganda, British
856	4		_uhttps://archive.org/details/secretsofcreweho00stua
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77798
999			_c118518 _d118518