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040 _aUtSlPG
041 7 _aen
_2iso639-1
050 4 _aHD
100 1 _aBerge, Wendell,
_d1903-1955
245 1 0 _aCartels
264 1 _aSalt Lake City, UT :
_bProject Gutenberg,
_c2026
300 _a1 online resource :
_bmultiple file formats
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aRelease date is 2026-03-01
508 _aTim Lindell, Daniel Lowe, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital Library.)
520 _a"Cartels" by Wendell Berge is a legal-economic treatise written in the mid-20th century. It argues that international industrial cartels operate as “private governments” that suppress competition, slow technological progress, inflate prices, and even endanger democratic institutions and national security. Drawing on antitrust cases and congressional records, it contends that cartel power—often organized around patent controls and market-sharing pacts, notably with German combines—has warped foreign trade and public policy. The work promises detailed case studies across key sectors to advocate vigorous antitrust enforcement and broader public access to technology. The opening of this work frames the postwar economic opportunity against the central obstacle of cartel power, with the author explaining his sources in Justice Department actions and Senate investigations. Early chapters chart the shift from domestic trusts to globally coordinated cartels, portray cartels as instruments that aided German militarism, and show how they restricted output, adulterated quality, manipulated patents, and created war-critical shortages. The discussion then ties cartel practices to foreign policy setbacks—especially in Latin America—and cites the 1939 Düsseldorf meeting as emblematic of plans to “rationalize” world trade through private agreements. A chapter on technology shows how monopolies channel and choke research, illustrated by internal memos and deals (Standard Oil’s 100‑octane dilemma, Bell Labs’ caution, Bausch & Lomb–Zeiss ties, pricing and adulteration tactics in plastics and pigments, even shorter‑life flashlight bulbs). The patents chapter lists major abuses, from fencing-in technology and crushing small inventors to the tungsten carbide price squeeze, glass-container licensing regimentation, and the suppression of fluorescent lighting. A chapter on medicines highlights insulin price control and global market carve-ups, the Bayer 205 episode, and how cartel contracts blocked U.S. firms from South American trade. The section closes mid‑account of a synthetic hormones cartel: DOJ prosecutions, wartime evasion tactics, a primer on hormone use (including potential in shock), and Schering A.G.’s use of its New Jersey affiliate to maintain blocked market channels. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534 _pOriginally published:
_cWashington: Public Affairs Press, 1946
653 _aTrusts, Industrial
653 _aMonopolies
653 _aRestraint of trade
856 4 _uhttps://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015045682781
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78077
999 _c118797
_d118797