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001			78171
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010			_a30028458
040			_aUtSlPG
041		7	_aen _2iso639-1
050		4	_aJC
100	1		_aLaski, Harold J. _q(Harold Joseph), _d1893-1950
245	1	0	_aLiberty in the modern state
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aSalt Lake City, UT : _bProject Gutenberg, _c2026
300			_a1 online resource : _bmultiple file formats
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aRelease date is 2026-03-11
508			_aSean – @parchmentglow
520			_aLiberty in the modern state by Harold J. Laski is a treatise on political philosophy written in the early 20th century. It explores what liberty means in modern society, arguing that genuine freedom requires limits on political authority, equality of opportunity, democratic accountability, judicial safeguards, and—above all—freedom of thought and speech. The opening of the work defines liberty as the absence of restraints that block individuals from pursuing happiness in matters they deem significant, rejects the idea that freedom is found in obedience to law, and insists that uncontrolled power is fatal to liberty. It contends that equality complements liberty by organizing opportunities fairly, and that democracy, periodic choice of rulers, and an independent judiciary are essential safeguards against abuse—especially amid growing delegated legislation and administrative discretion. Laski values bills of rights but warns they work only when citizens are vigilant; freedom ultimately survives by courage to resist, even through civil disobedience when conscience demands. He urges decentralization—both locally and within professions and industries—to spread power, foster consent, and spur creative self-government. Law, he argues, is not only command but appeal, winning authority by consent; when it compels against conscience, it invades personality. Turning to “freedom of the mind,” he defends unfettered speech and association as goods in themselves, showing censorship to be counterproductive and unworkable (critiquing bans for “obscenity” or “blasphemy,” and noting perverse effects and inconsistent standards), while allowing only narrow limits for personal defamation tied to public interest. He then begins the political free-speech question, distinguishing written from spoken advocacy, and argues that even revolutionary writings should not be suppressed. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534			_pOriginally published: _cNew York: Harper & Brothers, 1930
653			_aPolitical science
653			_aLiberty
856	4		_uhttps://archive.org/details/libertyinmoderns0000haro/page/n7/mode/2up
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78171
999			_c118891 _d118891