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001			78609
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005			20260610134825.0
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007			cr n
008			260607r20261930utu|||||o|||||||||||||| d
040			_aUtSlPG
041		7	_aen _2iso639-1
050		4	_aDT
100	1		_aAnderson, Eugene Newton, _d1900-1984
245	1	4	_aThe first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906
264		1	_aSalt Lake City, UT : _bProject Gutenberg, _c2026
300			_a1 online resource : _bmultiple file formats
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aRelease date is 2026-05-05
508			_aGalo Flordelis (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)
520			_a"The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906" by Eugene Newton Anderson is a historical study written in the early 20th century. It analyzes how the Moroccan question became a test of European diplomacy, tracing the alignments, rivalries, and calculations that set the stage for later pre-war crises. The focus is on the interplay between France, Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy, and Russia, with Morocco’s internal instability serving as the catalyst and backdrop. The opening of this study explains that the book treats Morocco chiefly as a stage for European power politics, arguing that the first Moroccan crisis fixed mindsets and alignments for later confrontations. It outlines sources (notably British and German document collections and French “Livres jaunes”), flags the thin French archival record, and frames diplomacy as the choices of a few key actors under the pressure of public opinion. The narrative then sketches Morocco’s decay under Sultan Abd-el-Aziz—financial folly, revolts, insecurity—and shows France advancing a “pacific penetration” via Algeria while publicly affirming the sultan’s sovereignty. Early steps include flexible frontier arrangements, military and financial assistance to the sultan, and the failure of Moroccan appeals to Britain and Germany. Next, the work describes the Franco-Italian entente: secret understandings that traded freedom of action in Morocco for Italy’s latitude in Tripoli and pledged Italian neutrality if France fought after “direct provocation,” blunting anti-French edges of the Triple Alliance. It closes this opening portion by setting up Spain’s weakened post-1898 position and its anxious stake in northern Morocco, paving the way for a Franco-Spanish understanding. (This is an automatically generated summary.)
534			_pOriginally published: _cChicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930
653			_aMorocco -- Foreign relations
653			_aMoroccan Crisis, 1904-1906
653			_aEurope -- Politics and government -- 20th century
856	4		_uhttps://archive.org/details/bwb_T3-BGL-716
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/78609
999			_c119327 _d119327